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Jurisdictions and causes of action: Commercial
considerations in dealing with bullying, stress and
harassment cases—Part II
Niall Neligan

B.L.*

In the concluding part of this two part article, the author will
examine how the courts have developed rules for dealing with
tortious claims for psychiatric injuries arising out of bullying, stress
and harassment cases. The article will examine whether it is
desirable to consolidate and codify employment rights law in order
to provide clarity to prospective litigants. Finally, the author will
argue that if codification is required, then this will necessitate a
change in the nature of present jurisdictions for bringing claims
involving bullying, stress and harassment in the workplace.

Tortious claims for psychiatric injuries arising from
bullying and stress cases
Having established that potential litigants in cases involving
bullying, stress and harassment can pursue claims under a variety of
headings, it is now necessary to consider what impact bullying and
harassment in the workplace is having on the emerging tort of stressinduced psychiatric injuries. The law on personal injuries in the
workplace is well settled; however, in the last 10 years there has
been a dramatic increase in the number of bullying and stressinduced claims coming before the courts. Whereas considerable
jurisprudence existed for dealing with cases involving physical
injuries and indeed, cases for nervous shock,1 the courts were, for a
long time, reluctant to allow claims for work-induced stress injuries
to succeed. Quite often, cases which were brought failed to satisfy
the test of foreseeability which applies to actions brought under the
tort of negligence.
However, since the case of Walker v Northumberland County
Council [1995] 1 All E.R. 727 , it has been accepted that the
common law principles of liability can apply to stress-induced
injuries.2 The principle enunciated in the Walker decision has
evolved and now applies to a variety of situations, including cases
where the stress-induced injury has been brought on by incidences of

bullying and harassment. A major problem encountered by the UK
courts in the aftermath of the Walker decision was to determine the
precise parameters of the duty concerned. Indeed, the Walker
decision had the potential to open the floodgates to a myriad of
fictitious or exaggerated claims reinforcing the view, in the UK
press at least, of a compensation culture at work.3 In reality, liability
for psychiatric injury caused by stress at work was no different from
liability for physical injury; the courts merely had to refine the
existing principles.
The opportunity to do so arose in Sutherland v Hatton ,4 which gave
the Court of Appeal a chance to review the law and refine the
principles of negligence and duty of care owed by an employer to an
employee5 .
In Hatton , the Court of Appeal established 16 principles which need
to be considered in a case involving work-induced stress.6 The
principles were summarised by Smith & Wood in their text on
Employment Law.7

〇. (a) existing principles of employer's liability can apply to work. (b)

. (c)

. (d)

. (e)

induced stress injuries— namely whether the injury was
foreseeable on the part of the employer;
mental injuries by their very nature are more difficult to
foresee than physical injuries, therefore an employer is entitled
to assume that an employee can withstand the normal
pressures of work;
there are no inherently dangerous jobs in relation to stress and
so much will depend on whether the demands on the employee
were excessive—was there evidence of prior sickness; did the
employee, or indeed, other employees complain about
stress?
whether or not the employer enquired from the employee if he
or she was able to cope with the strains of the job—an
employer is entitled to take at face value what the employee
tells him;
a breach of duty will only take place if the employer has failed
to take steps which he reasonably could have been expected to
take—which will inevitably boil down to whether the
employer had the necessary resources at his disposal;

. (f)

employers who provide an operative and confidential
counseling service are unlikely to be found in breach of
duty;
. (g) if the only way to avoid exposure to a breach and thus injury
to the employee is to dismiss, demote or reassign the
employee, the employer will not be in breach if the employee
demonstrates a willingness to continue working in that job;
. (h) there must be a causal connection between the breach of duty
and the stress-induced injury sustained; and
. (i) where the employer was only partly responsible (namely there
were other extraneous causal factors) then the employer will
only be liable for his part and the court must apportion the
blame when awarding damages. Finally, in Hatton the Court
took the view that there was an onus on the plaintiff to inform
his employer of the effect on his health.8 This may be practical
in some instances but where the immediate supervisor is the
person to whom the complaint is made, problems may arise.
The Hatton principles provide a framework whereby one employer
will be held responsible, while a more conscientious employer will
at least be afforded a valid defence, in so far that he could not have
foreseen, or if he did, at least tried to minimise the impact on the
employee.9 Furthermore, where the employer offers a confidential
advice service, with referral to appropriate counseling or treatment
services, he may depending on the circumstances, escape liability.
While this may be good in theory and practical for large employers
who have the resources to provide such a service, it will provide
little solace for a small to medium-size employer who may not be in
a position, for financial reasons or otherwise, to provide counseling
to their employers. Moreover, even the provision of such a service
may not be enough.
The Hatton principles, while helpful, place a very high burden on
the employee, and unsurprisingly, the House of Lords has lowered
the threshold in circumstances where the employee did not
specifically bring it to the employers attention. In the case of Barber
v Somerset County Council ,10 Lord Walker found liability was
established from a three week sick cert which referred to stress and
depression and which, he said, should have led to enquiries by
management about the plaintiff's problems and an attempt to
alleviate them:

“[An] employer is generally entitled to take what he is told by his
employee at face value, unless he has good reason to think to the
contrary. He does not generally have to make searching enquiries of
the employee or seek permission to make further enquiries of his
medical advisers.”11
The court took the view that the prudent employer, once he was
aware that an employee took time of work due to workload-induced
stress, should have investigated the situation to assess how the
difficulties might have been improved.
It is important to note that in relation to the duty of care owed, the
employer does not guarantee that an employee will not be injured;
the employer only undertakes to take reasonable care, and
consequently will only be liable if there is a lack of care on his part
in failing to prevent an occurrence which was reasonably
foreseeable. This of course places a corresponding duty on the
employee to look after himself, and not to blame the employer for
every incident which occurs or for his own misfortunes.
The Hatton decision must be interpreted in light of developments
where the stress-induced injury is attributed to bullying and
harassment, as can be seen in the case of Majrowski v Guy's and St
Thomas's NHS Trust .12 In the Majrowski case, the plaintiff would
have been statute-barred if his case had been one involving a
physical injury. Moreover, it is likely that he would have failed the
foreseeability test in Hatton . As noted above, Majrowski brought an
action under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and
succeeded in his argument that the defendants were vicariously
liable—because vicarious liability involved strict liability there was
no requirement for foreseeability.13 Additionally, the court allowed
the plaintiff to claim damages for anxiety as opposed to mental
injury which was the bedrock of the Hatton decision. Finally, the
action taken in Majrowski was an alternative to a discriminationbased case, where an employer would have a defence based on
taking all reasonable steps to prevent discriminatory behaviour.14 As
such, there was no defence available to the employer within the
meaning of the Prevention of Harassment Act 1997

Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005
The principles of breach of duty arising under the law of tort must
also be examined in light of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work
Act 2005 , in particular s.8, which sets out the general duties of an
employer:

. “8.—(1) Every employer shall ensure, so far as is reasonably
practicable, the safety, health and welfare at work of his or her
employees.
. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) , the
employer's duty extends, in particular, to the following:
.
(a) managing and conducting work activities in such a way
as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the
safety, health and welfare at work of his or her
employees;
.
(b) managing and conducting work activities in such a way
as to prevent, so far as is reasonably practicable, any
improper conduct or behaviour likely to put the safety,
health or welfare at work of his or her employees at
risk;

.
. …”
Section 8(1)(b) has a very broad application, providing a
complainant with a cause of action in bullying cases arising out of a
breach of statutory duty. This applies where the employer has
neglected to manage his workplace in such a way so as to prevent
improper conduct or behaviour, and which is therefore likely to put
the safety, health and welfare of his or her employees at risk.
The parameters of this provision have yet to be fully tested, although
the relevance on health and safety legislation was considered in one
of the most important cases to come before the courts: McGrath v
Trintech Technologies Limited and Trintech Group plc , which is
considered below.15 In the same year, Lavan J. in the High Court
expressly referred to health and safety law in the case of Quigley v
Complex Tooling and Moulding. 16

Tortious and contractual claims for psychiatric injuries
arising under Irish law
The law in Ireland has been re-evaluated in light of the Hatton
decision, which has provided some guidance to the courts in dealing
with cases involving bullying and stress-induced injury claims.
However, before considering court decisions, it is necessary to
consider the nature of the jurisdiction for dealing with such cases.
There are several question marks over the nature of the jurisdiction
for bringing stress-induced injury claims; the waters having been
somewhat muddied by the introduction of the Personal Injuries
Assessment Board. The present view would seem to suggest that
such claims should go before the board for consideration, however,
in the absence of any reference to assessment in the book of
quantum and moreover the absence of sufficient case law, it is likely
(though it cannot be taken for granted) that the board will authorise
claimants to issue civil proceedings.
After the Walker decision the Irish courts demonstrated a
willingness to consider such claims. As such the law must be divided
between pre-and post- Hatton decisions.

Pre-Hatton decisions
In Sullivan v Southern Health Board , the Supreme Court upheld a
High Court award of £15,000 in damages to a doctor “for the stress
and anxiety caused to him in both his professional and domestic life
by the persistent failure of the Board to remedy his legitimate
complaints”.17 Similarly, in McGrath v Minister for Justice and the
Attorney General , Mr McGrath, a member of An Garda Síochána
was awarded compensation by Morris J., which included
compensation of £40,000 for the stress, anxiety and general
disruption to his enjoyment of life.18 This stress occurred following
his suspension on grounds of criminal embezzlement, of which he
was found not guilty, because the suspension continued for a time
period which was longer than that within which it would have been
reasonably practicable to have held a full hearing into the
suspension.

In Curran v Cadbury (Ireland) , a case involving nervous shock, the
plaintiff claimed she suffered a psychiatric illness having been
involved in a workplace accident when she turned on a conveyor
machine unaware of the presence of a fitter who was servicing the
equipment at the time. McMahon J. in the Circuit Court
acknowledged the existence of the broad common law duty:
“The duty of the employer towards his employee is not confined to
protecting the employee from physical injury only; it also extends to
protecting the employee from non-physical injury such as
psychiatric illness or the mental illness that might result from
negligence or from harassment or bullying in the workplace.”19
With particular reference to the decision in Walker , the judge went
on to state:
“The English Courts imposed liability where the plaintiff
foreseeably suffered a nervous breakdown because of unreasonably
stressful working conditions imposed on him by his employer. There
is no reason to suspect that our Courts would not follow this line of
authority if it came before the Courts in this jurisdiction.”
Two years later in the case of McHugh v The Minister for Defence &
Others , Budd J. in the High Court awarded compensation for
negligence and breach of duty to a soldier who suffered posttraumatic stress disorder.20 In particular, the court made it clear that
the defendants were under a duty to take reasonable care for the
health and safety of their employees and to keep abreast of
contemporary knowledge in the area of those afflictions to which
soldiers were inevitably exposed in the course of duty. Furthermore,
the defendants had negligently failed to take appropriate care for the
health of the plaintiff, in so far that they had failed to observe the
obvious manifestations of post-traumatic stress disorder, or else had
failed to recognise the significance of the symptoms, and had
negligently failed to obtain remedial therapy for the plaintiff.
In O'Byrne v Dunnes Stores ,21 the plaintiff was awarded damages
arising out of a breach of contract where the plaintiff was forced to
move location without any notice or opportunity to make
representations. The court held that the defendant must have
contemplated that the plaintiff would suffer mental distress from this

particular breach of his contract. It was also noted that the plaintiff
had been subjected to an incident of bullying which the court
described as “inexcusably offensive” and “reprehensible”. The judge
went on to criticise the defendant for failing to apologise for its
behaviour towards the plaintiff, who had rendered 25 years service
to the company and who was entitled to be treated in a civilised
manner.

The impact of Hatton on Irish case decisions
Although the courts in this jurisdiction were prepared to consider
stress-induced injuries, like their UK counterparts before Hatton
there was an absence of guidelines from the superior courts
concerning the circumstances in which a claim would be entertained.
In McGrath v Trintech , Laffoy J. in the High Court considered the
importance of establishing foreseeability in cases for stress-induced
injuries at work.22 In McGrath , the plaintiff did not succeed in his
action for damages, the court holding:
“[that]…the plaintiff has not crossed the foreseeability threshold.
The risk of psychological harm to the plaintiff was not reasonably
foreseeable; The fundamental test is whether the defendant fell
below the standard to be properly expected of a reasonable and
prudent employer. In my view it did not. Having done what was
reasonable in the circumstances, the defendant did not breach its
duty of care and has no liability to the plaintiff either in contract or
in tort.”
The court recognised that the plaintiff did suffer from a recognisable
form of psychiatric illness, noting that there is a statutory duty on the
employer to protect the psychiatric health of employees. However,
the plaintiff failed to establish a breach of statutory duty on the part
of the defendant in consequence of which the plaintiff suffered
stress-induced injury.
Not long after the decision in McGrath , Lavin J. in the High Court
considered the question of foreseeability in Quigley . The plaintiff

had previously brought a successful claim against his employer in
which the Employment Appeals Tribunal (“EAT”) ordered his reengagement; he subsequently initiated proceedings claiming
damages for personal injuries as a result of harassment, bullying,
humiliation and victimisation by the Plant Manager and Managing
Director of the defendant company. Lavin J. noted that the plaintiff
had made several complaints to his employer about being bullied
and noted that nothing was done to prevent it re-occurring. Lavin J.
followed the test laid down by Laffoy J. in McGrath , concluding
that the inaction on the part of the defendant in Quigley fell short of
the standard of the reasonably prudent employer.
In Maher v Jabil ,23 Clarke J. applied the 16 principles derived from
the Hatton decision, accepting that the injury which the plaintiff
sustained was directly attributable to the experience in the
workplace. However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the
grounds that the types of injuries sustained were not reasonably
foreseeable. In reaching his decision, Clarke J. distinguished
between circumstances in which a plaintiff suffered from ordinary
occupational stress and circumstances in which a plaintiff sustained
an injury to his health arising out of unacceptable practices.24 The
court took the view that the targets which the employer had set for
the plaintiff in Maher , though challenging, were not excessive;
consequently, it was the court's belief that the defendants were not in
breach of duty to the plaintiff. Of further interest, the court in obiter
commented on the nature of the counselling services provided by
employers (in line with the common law developments initiated by
the Hatton decision), saying the mere existence of a counseling
service itself would not exempt an employer from liability where
such a service existed on paper but in reality did not provide such a
service necessary to ensure compliance with an appropriate duty of
care.
Perhaps the most interesting case to come before the High Court
since the McGrath decision25 is Berber v Dunnes Stores , where the
plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendant had unlawfully
repudiated his contract of employment and further sought damages
for personal injury founded both in tort and contract.26 In considering
the action brought under the headings of tort and contract, Laffoy J.
expressly referred to the judgment of Coleman J. in the Walker case

where it was held that the scope of the duty of care owed to an
employee to take reasonable care to provide a safe system of work is
co-extensive with the scope of the implied term as to the employee's
safety in the contract of employment; a statement which was later
approved by the Court of Appeal in the case of Gogay and
Hertfordshire County Council .27 Laffoy J. accepted counsel for
defendants submission that the starting point for consideration of the
issue of liability should be the questions raised by Clarke J. in
Maher ; namely, (a) has the plaintiff suffered an injury to his or her
health as opposed to what might be described as ordinary
occupational stress; (b) if so, is that injury attributable to the
workplace; and (c) if so, was the harm suffered to the particular
employee concerned reasonably foreseeable in all the circumstances.
The process of bringing a claim under breach of contract was also
considered in the recent decision of the High Court in Pickering v
Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited ,28 where liability was
imposed for breach of contract rather than breach of duty and
negligence. The court established that the defendant breached an
express term of the plaintiff's contract of employment by failing to
address concerns which had been raised by the plaintiff.
Consequently in the eyes of the court, the defendant's failure to
honour its contractual obligations and its treatment of the plaintiff
thereafter was a causative factor in the plaintiff's psychological
injury.
Having regard to the formula laid down by Hatton , Smyth J.
established that Pickering had suffered a psychological injury to her
health which went beyond ordinary occupational stress, and was
directly attributed to both the defendant's breach of contract and
breach of duty.29 The judge acknowledged that Microsoft was not
aware of the harm from the offset and consequently it was not
reasonably foreseeable; however, when the defendant became aware
that the plaintiff was suffering from stress then a clear duty was
owed.30 The court further noted that having heard evidence it would
have been useful and good practice if the plaintiff had been
contacted by a manager while on leave in an effort to resolve the
situation. Consequently, the court awarded the plaintiff general
damages of €60,000 for pain and suffering to date and €20,000 for
future loss.31

Dignity at work legislation
Having considered bullying, stress and harassment claims under the
headings above, and having noted the increasing overlap in cases
which have come before the courts and tribunals, the question is
whether legislation should be introduced to consolidate the law in
this field. Bullying, stress and harassment at work claims are clearly
on the rise. In the absence of one comprehensive statute covering
this area, employers are forced to navigate a variety of different
causes of action arising in different jurisdictions; clearly this is
unsustainable and impractical. From a critical evaluation of the law,
there is clearly a need for a statutory intervention which defines the
parameters of this burgeoning area of law and which limits the
jurisdictions in which actions may be brought.32 Certain countries
such as Belgium, France, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden have
already introduced specific legislation for dealing with workplace
bullying.33 In terms of common law jurisdictions, few have embraced
legislation to date, however there is movement towards placing
clearly defined rules on the statute book.34
The Expert Advisory Group on Workplace Bullying , in its most
recent report, has recommended statutory intervention, offering a
number of recommendations for dealing with the problem of
workplace bullying35 :

. 1. Legislative force to be given to the requirement that bullying be
a mandatory inclusion in all employers' Safety Statements and
that appropriate policies and procedures be implemented in
every workplace.
. 2. All employees, irrespective of employer or employment status,
would fall within the remit of these recommendations.
. 3. All persons in the workforce, whether permanent employees or
those operating under contracts of service, must be made
subject to the policies and procedures of the employing
organisation in respect of bullying.
. 4. The decisions of the Employment Appeals Tribunal or the
Labour Court in cases of bullying would be binding and

enforceable through the courts.
The Advisory Group has proposed a model for dealing with
bullying; however, the model suggested is laborious, time
consuming and involves too many stages.36 Furthermore, it does not
provide any guidance on how a defendant should deal with the
perpetrator(s) of bullying once a successful claim has been brought
before the Tribunal, or indeed the Labour Court.

Developments in the UK
Inevitably, because of proximity and the influence of UK decisions
on Irish law, it is necessary to consider movements towards placing
bullying, stress and harassment on a statutory footing in the UK.
Indeed, there have been a number of attempts by Baroness Gibson to
introduce dignity at work legislation before parliament, most
recently in 2001. The Dignity at Work Bill 2001 which was passed
by the House of Lords, (but not the House of Commons) makes for
interesting reading and may serve as a template for the Oireachtas to
consider in the future.37 The major provisions of the Bill are as
follows:
Right to dignity at work
Section 1:

. “1.-(1) Every employee shall have a right to dignity at work and
if the terms of the contract under which a person is employed
do not include that right they shall be deemed to include it.
. (2) Subject to section 5 of this Act, an employer commits a breach
of the right to dignity at work of an employee if that employee
suffers during his employment with the employer harassment
or bullying or any act, omission or conduct which causes him
to be alarmed or distressed including but not limited to any of
the following—
.
(a) behaviour on more than one occasion which is
offensive,
abusive,
malicious,
insulting
or
intimidating;
.
(b) unjustified criticism on more than one occasion;
.
(c) punishment imposed without reasonable justification,

.

or
(d) changes in the duties or responsibilities of the employee
to the employee's detriment without reasonable
justification.”

.
Victimisation
Section 2:

. “2.-(1) An employer commits a breach of the right to dignity at

.
.
.
.

work of an employee if he treats that employee less favourably
than he would treat other persons and does so by reason that
the employee has –
(a) brought proceedings under this Act against the employer
or any other person;
(b) given evidence or information in connection with
proceedings brought by any person under this Act
against the employer or any other person;
(c) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this
Act in relation to the employer or any other person;
(d) alleged that the employer or any other person has
committed an act which (whether or not the allegation so
states) would give rise to a claim under this Act, or by
reason that the employer knows or suspects that the
employee has done or intends to do any of those
things.”

.
The Bill provides for a more streamlined approach for dealing with
bullying complaints.
Complaint to an employment tribunal
Section 4:

. “4.-(1) Without prejudice to his right to remedies for breach of
contract for breach of the right to dignity at work, a complaint
by an employee that another person has committed a breach of
his right to dignity at work under this Act may be presented to
an employment tribunal.
. (2) An employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under

this section unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end
of the period of three months beginning with the day on which
the act complained of was done, unless in all the
circumstances of the case the tribunal considers that it is just
and equitable to do so.
. (3) For the purposes of this section any act extending over a
period or any persistent or recurrent breach of section 1(2)
shall be treated as done at the end of that period or at the date
of the last such act.”
Clearly this provision is markedly different from the recommended
model put forward by the Expert Advisory Group, suggesting that
the matter should go before the Labour Relations Commission
(“LRC”) first, with the possibility of the case being referred to a
Rights Commission and or the EAT / Labour Court later. The merit
of such an approach is that it reduces lead time, making the whole
process more user friendly and efficient for both employers and
employees.
The Bill also provides for a full defence to an employer under s.5 if,
at the time of the act, or acts complained of, the employer has in
force a Dignity at Work policy and has taken all steps to implement
it, including appointing a competent person to assist the employer in
undertaking the measures to comply with the requirements of this
Bill and the Dignity at Work policy. Provision is given to the
competent person to repudiate the act or acts complained of within
three working days after he / she has been notified. Furthermore,
positive steps are taken by the employer to remedy the loss.
The Bill also provides the complainant with redress where a
complaint has succeeded before a Tribunal: (a) an order may be
made declaring the rights of the complainant; (b) an order requiring
the respondent to pay to the complainant compensation assessed in
like manner as any other claim in tort38 ; (c) a recommendation that
the respondent take, within a specified period, action appearing to
the tribunal to be practicable for the purpose of obviating or
reducing the adverse effect of any breach of the right to dignity at
work to which the complaint relates.
Clearly a piece of legislation along the lines of the UK Dignity at
Work Bill 2001 would be of great assistance in alleviating some of

the problems facing employers and employees in the present climate.
However, the Bill has its shortcomings and could be more
comprehensive in relation to the provision dealing with Right to
Dignity at Work under s.1. Curiously, the Bill makes provision for
compensation assessed in a manner as any claim in tort. This may
include an award for injuries to feelings, although the precise scope
of the provision is vague and it remains unclear whether it would
cover circumstances in which an employee suffers a stressedinduced psychiatric injury.
Ultimately the question that needs to be asked is whether it would be
desirable to create an all-embracing statute dealing with bullying,
stress and harassment in this jurisdiction. If legislation were passed
to merely supplement the existing provisions then it would be a
fruitless exercise. However, if the legislation has as its object or
effect the consolidation, codification and amendment of existing
provisions then it would be a useful instrument; as to how it would
be achieved is another matter, and would inevitably require changes
in jurisdiction.39

Conclusions
What is clear from an examination of the law dealing with bullying,
stress and harassment is that there are too many causes of action
dealt with in a myriad of jurisdictions. It would be wrong to
conclude that the laws which presently exist for dealing with claims
of bullying, stress and harassment amount to a code, as in reality the
laws examined above are merely vehicles which have been used by
litigants to seek redress in the absence of dedicated legislation. One
longstanding solution would be to clarify, consolidate and codify
existing employment rights legislation, much in the same way as
taxation and company law have been consolidated in the past.40 By
adopting the consolidation and codification model, some of the
anomalies which exist under the present law could be addressed; for
example, the dismissal provisions under the common law, the Unfair
Dismissals Acts and the Equality Acts could be streamlined and
broadened.41 Provision could also be made for circumstances where
the employee has suffered an injury to his health arising out of workrelated stress, thus bringing together the law under the Safety, Health

and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and the law of tort based on the
courts interpretation of the Hatton principles.
To achieve consolidation and codification however, would require a
revolutionary change in jurisdiction, a discussion of which would
require a separate article. From the author's perspective, the
existence of parallel institutions such as the Rights Commission, the
Employment Appeals Tribunal and the Equality Tribunal is
unsatisfactory and untenable in the long run. One possible solution
would be to restructure the existing jurisdictions to create a three-tier
system to deal exclusively with employment rights law. The first tier
would be a mediation-based service to deal with non-contentious
issues; the second tier would involve creating a dedicated
Employment Tribunal (amalgamating the EAT and Equality
Tribunals) equipped to deal with contentious employment rights
disputes, including equality claims with a jurisdiction limited to a
defined monetary amount; and the third tier would involve the
creation of a dedicated Employment Law Court as a division of
either the Circuit Court or the High Court, equipped to provide
equitable remedies and competent to deal with awards of
compensation in excess of the Employment Tribunal.42
*

[ Niall Neligan is a practising barrister. ]

1

[ The implied duty of care to prevent psychiatric injury from stress
has developed separately from the tort of nervous shock which tends
to arise from trauma. Whereas psychiatric stress cases evolve over a
period of time, for example in the Walker case, the stress-induced
factor was excessive work demands. It should be noted that there is
nothing to preclude an employee from bringing an action for a
trauma-induced injury at work; however, they would still have to
comply with the normal rules for nervous shock as established in the
case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 A.C.
455; [1999] 1 All E.R. 1 (HL) . ]
2

[ Although the Walker decision marks a watershed in respect of
claims for stress-induced injuries, it was by no means the first such
decision of this nature. Indeed, almost 20 years before, in the case of
Cox v Philips Industries Ltd [1976] I.C.R. 138 at 146; [1976] 3 All
E.R. 161 , Lawson J. noted: “I can see no reason in principle why, if
a situation arises which within the contemplation of the parties

would have given rise to vexation, distress and general
disappointment and frustration, the person who is injured by a
contractual breach should not be compensated in damages for that
breach. Doing the best I can, because money can never really make
up for mental distress and vexation – this is a common problem of
course in personal injury cases.” ]
3

[ In the aftermath of the Walker decision there were a number of
cases where the court examined the scope of the employer's duty, in
particular the Scottish courts in the cases of Rorrison v West
Lothian College [1999] Rep. L.R. 102 and Cross v Highlands and
Islands Enterprise Board [2001] I.R.L.R. 336 . ]
4

[ [2002] 2 A.E.R. 1. ]

5

[ This was, in fact, four conjoined appeals taken against different
employers by different complainants ]
6

[ The threshold question is whether this kind of harm to this
particular employee was reasonably foreseeable: this has two
components: (a) an injury to health (as distinct from occupational
stress) which (b) is attributable to stress at work (as distinct from
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